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A Little Fish in a Big Sea: Should
Consumer Protection Statutes
Override Class Arbitration Waivers?
Kristian v. Comcast Corp.'
I. INTRODUCTION
As arbitration agreements have become increasingly commonplace in deal-
ings between large companies and their subscribers, courts have taken a strong
interest in protecting consumer rights. As part of this protection, courts have to
apply federal statutes, protecting the right to treble damages and recovery of attor-
ney's fees in the context of mass arbitration agreements. The difficulty comes in
attempting to allow companies to exercise their freedom of contract while protect-
ing consumers with little bargaining power. Although other courts have largely
favored arbitration, and upheld its applicability, a clash remains between con-
sumer protection statutes and the waiver of those statutory rights for arbitration
purposes.
11. FACTS AND HOLDING
Martha Kristian and James D. Masterson brought a claim against Comcast
Corporation under the Clayton Antitrust Act2 in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts. 3 Jack Rogers and Paul Pinella also brought a claim
against Comcast Corporation in Massachusetts state court under the Massachu-
setts Antitrust Act.4 Because the Rogers/Pinella claim involved federal issues of
arbitrability, Comcast removed this claim to the U.S. District Court for the District
of Massachusetts.
5
The four plaintiffs subscribed to Comcast's cable services in the Boston area.6
They alleged that Comcast entered into "swapping agreements' 7 with other cable
service providers in 1999 and 2001 to keep its hold on markets and territories. 8
The plaintiffs sought to certify as a class all Boston-area Comcast subscribers
since December 1999, the date of the swapping agreement, because Comcast's
actions affected all subscribers.
9
1. 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15,26 (2000).
3. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 30-31.
4. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, § 6 (1978); Kristian, 446 F.3d at 30.
5. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 30.
6. Id. at 30.
7. In a swapping agreement, companies consolidate their holds on markets by agreeing to swap or
exchange cable television assets in violation of federal antitrust laws. Id.; see also id. at 30, n.l.
8. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 30.
9. Id.
1
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When the plaintiffs first subscribed to Comcast's cable services,10 their ser-
vice agreements did not contain an arbitration provision. I" In November 2001,
Comcast included a copy of its 2001 Policies and Practices document as a billing
stuffer with customers' monthly bills. 12 This billing stuffer added an arbitration
provision to their agreement.' 3 Comcast further revised the arbitration provision
in 2002, but left the provision unchanged in 2003.'
4
Comcast argued that the customer complaints should be arbitrated because
the 2002/2003 Policies and Practices document' 5 contained an arbitration agree-
ment.' 6 Even though the customers were challenging Comcast's 1999 swapping
agreement, Comcast claimed the arbitration clause had a retroactive effect and
should apply to this dispute.' 7 The customers argued that since the claim arose
before the policy change, the agreement to arbitrate was not binding.' 8 Addition-
ally, the customers argued that the arbitration agreement prevented them from
exercising their statutory rights under federal antitrust law, violated public policy,
and was unconscionable under state law. 19
The district court ruled similarly on both the federal and state antitrust
claims.20 The court found that the 2002/2003 arbitration did not have a retroactive
effect, and refused to rule on the other arguments.21 Comcast filed an interlocu-
tory appeal, and the First Circuit stayed both cases pending appeal and consoli-
dated them.
22
The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision.2
3
The court found that the language had a retroactive effect and that Comcast had
given adequate notice to the subscribers. Because the arbitration agreement con-
tained a provision for severance, arbitration could proceed even if certain portions
were removed.24 Reversing the district court's decision that the arbitration agree-
ment did not have a retroactive effect, the First Circuit found that when an arbitra-
tion agreement conflicts with statutes designed to further public policies, provi-
sions denying a customer the vindication of her statutory rights cannot be en-
forced.25






15. The court referred to the "2002/2003 Policies and Practices" because the arbitration agreement
did not change after 2002. Id. at 30.
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HI. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Retroactivity
In general, certain contractual language can indicate a retroactive effect.26
Language requiring arbitration for "any controversy between us arising out of
your business ' ' 27 or "any controversy arising out of or relating to any of my ac-
counts" 28 has been applied retroactively in multiple jurisdictions. 29 The First Cir-
cuit, however, refused to find retroactivity in Choice Sec. Sys., Inc. v. AT&T
Corp.30 Despite language requiring arbitration for "all disputes... arising out of
or relating to the products furnished pursuant to this Agreement," the court re-
fused to extend arbitration because the clause was a "run-of-the-mill integration
clause."
31
The Supreme Court has held that "as a matter of federal law, any doubts con-
cerning the scope of arbitrable agreements should be resolved in favor of arbitra-
tion." The First Circuit has held, somewhat differently, that arbitration "does not
totally displace ordinary rules of contractual interpretation." 33 In Paul Revere
Variable Annuity Ins. Co. v. Kirschhofer,34 the court stated that the presumption in
favor of arbitration applies only to questions of scope, not necessarily to questions
on the merits of the case. 35 To further clarify its position, the court established a
test to determine the scope of arbitration applicability.36 The court stated that
where a federal policy favoring arbitration conflicts with state contract law, and
there is a question of scope, the federal arbitration policy trumps the state contract
law. 37 This decision follows Supreme Court precedent, which favors arbitration
for any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues. 38
B. Arbitrability
In the First Circuit, there is a presumption that arbitration provides a fair and
adequate mechanism for enforcing statutory rights. 39 The Supreme Court has held
that a statute is satisfied when a litigant can effectively vindicate her statutory
26. See, e.g., Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 1023, 1028 (11 th Cir. 1982);
Beneficial Nat'l Bank, U.S.A. v. Payton, 214 F. Supp. 2d 679, 689 (S.D. Miss. 2001); Whistler v. H.J.
Meyers & Co., 948 F. Supp. 798, 802 (N.D. 111. 1996).
27. Belke, 693 F.3d at 1028.
28. Whistler, 948 F. Supp. at 802.
29. See, e.g., Belke, 693 F.2d at 1028; Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 689; Whistler, 948
F. Supp. at 802; Boulet v. Bangor Sec., 324 F. Supp. 2d 120, 125 n.4 (D. Me. 2004).
30. 141 F.3d 1149 (lst Cir. 1998).
31. Id.
32. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
33. 226 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2000).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 25.
37. Id.
38. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25.
39. Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 170 F.3d 1, 14 (lst Cir. 1999).
No.l]]
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rights in arbitration. 40 If a litigant is unable to vindicate her statutory rights, how-
ever, arbitration may be denied altogether.
Three Supreme Court decisions form guidelines for determining whether a
claim should be decided by an arbitrator or a court. The first case established
categories in which courts should rule instead of an arbitrator. In Howsam v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 41 the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) placed a six-year statute of limitation on claims decided by an arbitra-
tor.42 Since Dean Witter's claim had exceeded the statute of limitations, the Court
had to decide whether a court or arbitrator should declare the issue "ineligible for
arbitration. ' '43 The Court described two categories in which courts rather than
arbitrators should resolve disputes: (1) disputes "about whether the parties are
bound by a given arbitration clause," 44 and (2) disagreements "about whether an
arbitration clause in a concededly binding contract applies to a particular type of
controversy., 45 Since NASD's statute of limitations rule did not fall into either of
these categories, the Court held that the arbitrator should decide whether the issue
was ineligible for arbitration.46
The second case, PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book,47 examined the recov-
48
ery of punitive damages. A group of physicians brought a number of claims
against health care management organizations, and the HMO sought to compel
arbitration. 49 The physicians opposed arbitration because the RICO statute, under
which the claims were brought, allowed for punitive damages, and the arbitration
agreement did not allow for punitive damages. 50 The HMOs claimed that because
the contractual language contained specific preclusions, no issue of arbitrability
existed, and an arbitrator should resolve the dispute.51 The agreement specifically
precluded the recovery of punitive damages, but was unclear on the recovery of
treble damages.52 The Court ultimately applied Howsam and compelled arbitra-
tion, finding that there was too much legal ambiguity to conclude a question of
arbitrability existed. 53
The third case, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle,54 concerned the applicability
of class arbitration. 55 In Bazzle, a number of homeowners alleged consumer pro-
tection violations against a commercial lender in South Carolina.56 The arbitration
clauses were silent on the issue of permitting class arbitration. 57 The commercial
40. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soder Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985).
41. 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
42. Id. at 81.
43. Id. at 82.
44. Id. at 84.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 85-86.
47. 538 U.S. 401 (2003).
48. Id. at 405.
49. Id. at 402-03.
50. Id. at 403.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 405-07.
53. Id.
54. 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
55. Id. at 447.
56. Id. at 447-48.
57. Id. at 447.
[Vol. 2007
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lender argued that since the agreement did not explicitly allow for class arbitra-
tion, it was not allowed. 58 The Supreme Court determined that the ambiguous
language created "a disputed issue of contract interpretation." 59 The Howsam
exception assumes that parties intended courts, not arbitrators, to decide certain
disputes.6° This exception did not apply in Bazzle, however, because the contract
did not expressly allow or prohibit arbitration. 61 Additionally, because Bazzle did
not concern a state statute or judicial procedures, the Court found that an arbitrator
could determine whether class arbitration was allowed.62
The First Circuit further defined the Howsam holding. in Marie v. Allied
Home Mortgage Corp.63 In Marie, the arbitration agreement itself limited the
amount of time a consumer had to initiate a claim against the mortgage com-
pany.64 This differed from Howsam, where the statute of limitations was found in
the arbitrator's governing rules, not the arbitration agreement itself.65 Still, the
court decided that this type of decision was "presumed to be for the arbitrator" and
the arbitrator's expertise would allow him to properly interpret the arbitration
agreement.
66
C. Vindication of Statutory Rights
In Massachusetts, a statutory right or remedy may be waived "when the
waiver would not frustrate the public policies of the statute." 67 In Canal Elec. Co.
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court examined
whether certain statutory rights in the state's antitrust laws could be waived by
contractual agreement. The court distinguished property rights of individuals
from protection of the general public.69 Because Canal involved property rights,
the waiver was upheld.' 0 Additionally, the Court stated that Massachusetts' statu-
tory requirement for treble damages is waiveable when the public interest is not
harmed. 71 The court was careful to note that its decision "would not effectuate a
consumer's waiver of rights," leaving that issue undecided in Massachusetts.
72
The leading Supreme Court case on awarding attorney's fees in arbitration is
Green Tree Fin. Corp. -Ala. v. Randolph.73 In Randolph, a mobile home purchaser
58. Id. at 450.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 452.
61. Id. at 452-53.
62. Id.
63. 402 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005).
64. Id. at 11. The arbitration agreement limited the customer's time to 60 days. Id.
65. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 81-82 (2002); Marie, 402 F.3d at 11.
66. Marie, 402 F.3d at 11. For an in-depth discussion of Marie, see David LeFevre, Whose Finding
Is it Anyway?: The Division of Labor between Courts and Arbitrators with Respect to Waiver, 2006 J.
Disp. RESOL. 305.
67. Canal Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 548 N.E.2d 182 (Mass. 1990).
68. Id. at 183.




73. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
No.l]
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brought claims under the federal Truth in Lending Act against her lender.74 The
arbitration agreement between Randolph and his lender was silent on the issue of
costs and fees. 75 If Randolph had to bear the cost, she argued, it would not be
financially viable to pursue the claim.76 The Court held that a party, seeking to
invalidate an arbitration agreement on the basis of cost, bears the burden of show-
ing the likelihood of incurring such coStS. 77 Additionally, the Court found that the
arbitration agreement's mere silence "alone is plainly insufficient to render it un-
enforceable. 78
The U.S. Supreme Court has held in Bazzle that an arbitration agreement may
expressly limit class arbitration. 79 The decision also states that any ambiguous
terms should be interpreted by the arbitrator under state contract law. 80 Multiple
jurisdictions have followed this precedent in ruling on class arbitration waivers.
In the Eleventh Circuit case of Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., LLC,81
82the court ruled that class arbitration can be waived. Following Bazzle, the court
held that whether a contract was adhesive and unconscionable was an issue for the
arbitrator, not for the court.83 North Dakota also allows class arbitration in adhe-
sion contracts. In Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n ND,84 the North Dakota Su-
preme Court held that class arbitration could be waived so long as none of the
consumer's substantive rights and remedies were limited. 85 In all cases upholding
class arbitration bans, the determining factor has been whether an individual party
could achieve a desired remedy, regardless of convenience.86
TV. INSTANT DECISION
In Kristian v. Comcast Corp., the First Circuit examined the retroactivity of
an arbitration agreement, along with the agreement's waiver of federal and state
statutory rights. The court reversed the District Court's decision on retroactivity,
finding that the arbitration language did not prohibit retroactive application. Next,
the court determined that issues about statutory rights were properly decided by a
court, not an arbitrator. The First Circuit ruled that treble damages, attorney's
fees, and class arbitration could not be waived because it would prevent the vindi-
cation of statutory rights.
The First Circuit found that the arbitration agreement's language, which did
not explicitly prohibit retroactive application, applied to the claims arising in 1999
87and 2001. Following Supreme Court precedent, it reasoned that any doubt about
74. Id. at 82.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 90.
77. Id. at 92.
78. Id.
79. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 453-54 (2003).
80. Id.
81. 400 F.3d 868 (11 th Cir. 2005).
82. Id. at 878.
83. Id. at 877.
84. 693 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 2005).
85. Id. at 926.
86. Linda M. Laslet, Keith Maurer & H. Wesley Sunu, Recent Developments in Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 41 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 123, 141 (2006).
87. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 35-36 (1st Cir. 2006).
[Vol. 2007
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arbitrability should be decided in favor of arbitration. 88 Because the state contract
law conflicted with federal arbitration policy, federal preference for arbitration
trumped the state law claim.s9 The court also found that customers received
proper notice of the arbitration provisions as required by federal law.90 While
Comcast did not emphasize the arbitration agreement changes, such attention was
not required under federal law. 91 The court stated that while Comcast could have
complied more clearly with the federal notice requirements by listing the effective
date of the notice, Comcast fulfilled all federal requirements.
92
The First Circuit held that some issues were best decided by an arbitrator,
while other issues could be best handled by a court. The court found that the arbi-
trator could best decide questions of discovery and limitations. 93 Any dispute over
discovery would be procedural in nature, leaving it well within the arbitrator's
jurisdiction. 94 Also, applying Howsam, the court determined that allegations of
waiver or delay were squarely in the purview of the arbitrator, because the claims
did not concern the scope of arbitrability. 95 On the other hand, the court stated that
arbitration provisions in conflict with statutory law designed to vindicate rights
may be decided in a court.
9 6
The court also decided that prohibitions against treble damages were inva-
lid.97 The First Circuit reasoned that no Supreme Court decision had allowed
waiver of treble damages in consumer cases.98 Citing the Mitsubishi decision, the
instant court stated that a waiver of treble damages for federal antitrust violations
would be invalid on public policy grounds.99 Additionally, the court found that
the prohibitions against attorney's fees and costs were invalid.1° ° Because the
high cost of litigation could prevent a customer from bringing a claim, the court
viewed the act of forcing the consumer to pay as essentially barring the con-
sumer's claim. 1° 1 Finally, the court invalidated the prohibition against class ac-
tions. ° 2 Because the invalid provisions were severable from the arbitration agree-
ment, however, the court allowed the arbitration to proceed.
10 3
88. Id. at 35.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 36-37.
91. Id. at 36.
92. Id. 47 C.F.R. § 76.1603(b) (2001) (requires customers to be provided with written notice of any
changes in rates, programming services or channel positions a minimum of 30 days before the date of
change).
93. Id. at 43.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 44.
96. Id. at 47.
97. Id. at 48.
98. Id. at 48-49.
99. Id. at 49.
100. Id. at 52.
101. Id. at 52-53.
102. Id. at 59.
103. Id. at 62.
No.l]
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V. COMMENT
The decision in Kristian makes major changes to arbitration agreements in the
First Circuit. The language in the Comcast arbitration agreement expressly pro-
hibited a subscriber from receiving treble damages and attorney's fees, and also
waived class arbitration. 104 The court held that because state and federal law al-
lowed for recovery of treble damages and attorney's fees, the waiver was inva-
lid. 105 Additionally, the court held that class arbitration could not be prohibited.
10 6
In examining all three waiver provisions within the Policies and Practices docu-
ment, the court applied the tests for effective vindication of statutory rights.
A. Waiver of Treble Damages and Attorney's Fees
In examining waiver of treble damages and attorney's fees, the court relied
heavily on Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court had previously stated
that allowing treble damages and the recovery of attorney's fees furthers a public
interest. ° 7 Additionally, treble damages in antitrust actions are a federal statutory
right.' O8 The First Circuit's denial of waiver is well placed, given the respective
bargaining positions of Comcast and each individual subscriber. In a mass-
arbitration context, a single subscriber cannot be expected to bargain with Com-
cast over this waiver, creating a "take-it-or-leave-it" scenario. Allowing this
waiver to stand would go against Canal and Randolph's requirement that each
party be allowed to fully vindicate statutory rights.
Likewise, the federal antitrust statute allows for the recovery of a reasonable
attorney's fee.1° 9 The court again appropriately refused to waive this recovery
right. Applying Randolph, a single subscriber would incur costs likely exceeding
the recovery for an antitrust violation. Preventing recovery of attorney's fees
would interfere with a subscriber's vindication of his statutory rights. Comcast
had agreed to finance the cost of the arbitration, but the subscriber would still
have to pay his own attorney's fees.
B. Waiver of Class Arbitration
For class arbitration, however, the court stands on shakier ground. The arbi-
tration agreement expressly prohibits class arbitration. 0 As noted by the court,
the agreement did not forbid class actions, only class arbitrations."' If the First
Circuit chose to not enforce the arbitration agreement, the claim could proceed on
a class action basis. However, the court decided that, under federal precedent, the
104. Id. at 29-30.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle,
539 U.S. 444 (2003).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982).
109. Id.
110. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 29-30.
111. Id. at 54.
[Vol. 2007
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requirement to arbitrate must be enforced because the contract language was un-
ambiguous, and each invalid provision was severable.
Several circuits have addressed class arbitration waivers, reaching varying re-
suits.112 Cases in the Third and Fourth Circuits provide precedent in Comcast's
favor."13 The court cites the Third Circuit decision, Johnson v. West Suburban
Bank," 4 for authority. Johnson involved a Truth in Lending Act (TILA) claim.
The Third Circuit relied on a Supreme Court case, Gilmer v. Johnson/Interstate
Lane Corp.,115 where the Court said that so long as a party can vindicate its statu-
tory rights, arbitration can proceed." 6 The Johnson court extended Gilmer to the
TILA, identifying three factors to help determine the validity of a class arbitration
bar. The Kristian court adopted these three factors, applying them to the antitrust
context.
For its first factor, Johnson states that the recovery amount is not necessarily
increased in a class forum. 1 7 The Kristian court determined that without a class
action, customers will not sue at all in antitrust cases.' 8 It reasoned that each
customer's costs will potentially outweigh the amount recovered in the claim.
The court misinterprets the heart of Johnson's argument. The Third Circuit in-
tended this statement to simply mean that a plaintiff would not see a larger recov-
ery in class arbitration than in solo arbitration. 19 Presumably, the damage amount
per customer would remain constant regardless of the number of plaintiffs. Ap-
plying Johnson to Kristian, all cable subscribers could recover the same amount
by suing individually as they could as a class. This differs with the First Circuit's
conclusion that plaintiffs will not sue by themselves.
For its second factor, Johnson states that if the recovery of attorney's fees and
costs is permitted, then each party can be adequately represented outside of a class
forum. 12° The instant court rejects this factor by introducing the idea of "opportu-
nity costs," or the external costs of filing a lawsuit against Comcast. Because
each plaintiff would have to personally assert a case against Comcast, the "oppor-
tunity costs" would be significantly larger in class arbitration. The Johnson court
did not factor in "opportunity costs," presumably because they exist in all types of
litigation.122 Kristian and her fellow subscribers in this lawsuit would bear "op-
portunity costs" far greater than those subscribers not involved in the litigation,
yet all may be entitled to the same recovery, as all were similarly harmed. The
Johnson requirement for the recovery of attorney's fees and costs avoids one of
112. Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2000); Snowden v. CheckPoint Check
Cashing, 290 F.3d 631 (4th Cir. 2002); Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., 400 F.3d 868 (11 th
Cir. 2005); Livingston v. Associated Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 53 (7th Cir. 2003).
113. Johnson, 225 F.3d at 374; Snowden, 290 F.3d at 638.
114. 225 F.3d 366.
115. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
116. Id. at 28.
117. Johnson, 225 F.3d at 374.
118. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 58 (1st Cir. 2006).
119. The Kristian court stated that due to the cost of providing expert witnesses, no customers would
bring a claim for a small value. Id. However, the first Johnson factor speaks only to the sums available
for recovery, without discussion of attorney's fees, expert witness retention fees, or other costs. John-
son, 225 F.3d at 374.
120. Johnson, 225 F.3d at 374-75.
121. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 58-59.
122. Johnson, 225 F.3d at 374-75.
No.l]
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the First Circuit's major fears: that a subscriber will be left with hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars in attorney's and expert's fees after a case involving multiple
subscribers.
For its third factor, Johnson states that class arbitration can be barred if ad-
ministrative enforcement can remedy the problem. 123 In applying the last factor,
the Kristian court noted that if Comcast's class arbitration was barred, administra-
tive enforcement could still occur. 124 The Johnson court was satisfied that the
TILA could be enforced through an administrative process. Because Comcast
falls under FCC regulations, 125 it seems likely that the administrative process
could help reduce the number of swapping agreements entered into by all tele-
communications companies. Therefore, the court's conclusion that no enforce-
ment will happen if class arbitration is barred is questionable.
It is important to distinguish the court's refusal to uphold the waiver of treble
damages and attorney's fees from its decision on class arbitration. Treble dam-
ages and attorney's fees provisions can be found in the federal antitrust statute.
The court does not cite a single federal statute that prohibits the waiver of class
arbitration. It cites Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, which provides for class actions, but notes
that this is not a ban on class arbitration, although the rule "effectively forecloses
the use of any class-based mechanism." 126 Still, the court does not say that class
actions cannot be waived under federal law.
C. Policy Rationales behind Barring Class Arbitration in Mass Consumer
Transactions
Four policy rationales exist for allowing class arbitration waiver to stand.
First, class arbitration could result in consumers paying higher costs in the future.
Arbitration was initially designed to be a low-cost, efficient way of evaluating and
deciding claims.' 2 7 Grouping claims together will increase the size of the arbitra-
tion along with costs and time. Second, even assuming that Comcast holds supe-
rior bargaining power in requiring a class arbitration waiver, the subscribers were
consenting parties to the cable subscription contract. Courts have long recognized
that one-sided adhesion contracts are binding on both parties. 128 The subscribers
have voluntarily agreed to Comcast's terms, regardless of whether or not they
could bargain with Comcast to change the terms.
Third, in class action claims in a judicial forum, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 provides
requirements for notification to class members of the pending lawsuit. Under the
Federal Arbitration Act, however, no rules exist to specify exactly how each po-
tential class member is notified of the potential arbitration. 129 Because a defining
factor of arbitration is confidentiality, a conflict exists between keeping confiden-
123. Id. at 375.
124. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 57.
125. Id. at 36.
126. Id. at 54.
127. Joshua S. Lipshutz, Note, The Court's Implicit Roadmap: Charting the Prudent Course at the
Juncture of Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and Class Action Lawsuits, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1677,
1711 (2005).
128. Id. at 1713.
129. Id. at 1716-17.
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tiality between the subscriber and the cable company and notifying potential class
members of the claim. Fourth, Congress has recognized the Federal Arbitration
Act as a valid and respectable alternative to litigation. 30 As more and more com-
panies begin waiving class arbitration, consumer advocacy groups may force
Congress to take a position on the issue. A possible amendment to the Federal
Arbitration Act could explicitly allow or prohibit waiver of class arbitration once
and for all.
Examining Kristian and other class arbitration waiver cases, there is a trend
towards banning class arbitration waivers.' 3 1 Hopefully, courts can create consis-
tency to help both corporation and individual consumers understand their rights in
the future. Additionally, this trend will likely reduce the overall amount of arbi-
tration. 132 This appears to contradict with the judiciary's favoritism towards arbi-
tration, but the decrease will result from the consolidation of all arbitrations into
one large class arbitration.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Kristian holding increases consumer rights in the First Circuit. Barring
recovery of treble damages and attorney's fees despite statutory authority to the
contrary is not a new concept, and courts continue to prevent the waiver of class
arbitration in consumer cases. The court appears to have severely limited the
application of class arbitration waivers in future cases. Plaintiffs would need to
seek large damage amounts to meet the First Circuit's economics requirements. If
this decision is applied in other circuits, it could indicate a strong disfavor towards
waiving class arbitration, while maintaining favor for arbitration in general.
THOMAS WILMOWSKI
130. Id. at 1718.
131. Jonathan Rizzardi, Recent Developments, Discover Bank v. Superior Court of LA., 21 OHIO ST.
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